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CREDIT EQUALITY COMES TO WOMEN: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE EQUAL CREDIT
OPPORTUNITY ACT
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, American society has confined women to an in-
ferior status. Although in the past such discrimination was ac-
cepted almost without question,' there has recently been an increas-
ingly widespread effort to change this attitude. Indeed, advocates
of women's rights are seeking to establish equality for women in
all aspects of life.
Consumer credit is an important area in which extensive sex dis-
crimination has existed.2 It is essential that all people be accorded
1. See, e.g., Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights
Amendment: A Constitutional Basis For Equal Rights For Women, 80 YALE
L.J. 871, 872 (1971).
2. "Consumer credit" means credit offered or extended to an individual
in which the money, property, or service which is the subject of the transac-
tion is primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 12 C.F.R. §
202.3 (f) (1976). As one commentator stated: "This [is] a national prob-
lem-and systematic discrimination against women was built into the sys-
tem." Lilliston, Pushing For a Federal Equal Credit Law, L.A. Times, Oct.
19, 1973, pt. IV, at 10, col. 1. The following example is typical of creditors'
discriminatory attitudes:
A man and a woman with virtually identical qualifications applied
for a $600 loan to finance a used car without the signature of the
other spouse. Each applicant was the wage earner, and the spouse
was in school. Eleven of the banks visited by the woman "either
strictly required the husband's signature or stated it was their pref-
erence although they would accept an application and possibly
make an exception to the general policy." When the same banks,
plus two additional banks that would make no commitment to the
female applicant, were visited by the male interviewer, six said
that they would prefer both signatures but would make an excep-
tion for him; one insisted on both signatures; and "six told the maleinterviewer that he, as a married man, could obtain the loan with-
out his wife's signature."
NATIONAL CoMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES 1, 153 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CONSUMER CREDIT]. See
SENATE COMm. ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRs, REPORT ON TRUTH
IN LENDING ACT AMENDMENTS, S. Rep. No. 278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
[hereinafter cited as TIL ACT AMENDMENTS].
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an equal opportunity to obtain credit,3 for credit partially deter-
mines access to items such as home ownership,4 education,5 and con-
sumer goods." Because many families function on the extension of
credit, any denial of credit to women deprives them of equal pur-
chasing power and lessens their ability to provide for the needs of
themselves and their families.7 Nevertheless, creditors engaged in
numerous discriminatory acts against women applicants. Although
some aspects of this discrimination depended solely on marital sta-
tus, other forms were common to all women.8
A recently enacted federal statute, the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act (ECOA),9 is designed to eliminate much of the sex discrimina-
tion existing in the area of credit. The Act, which becomes fully
effective this year,10 provides that:
3. See Statement of Arline Lotman, Hearings on the Economic Problems
of Women Before the Joint Economic Committee, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at
482 (1973). [Hearings are hereinafter cited as Economic Problems of
Women]. This is especially important now, for consumer reliance on
credit has grown drastically in the last thirty years. Indeed, the total
amount of outstanding consumer credit has increased from $21.5 billion in
1950 to over $137 billion in 1971. CONSUMER CREDIT 5.
4. See Comment, Discrimination Against Women in Home Mortgage Fi-
nancing, 3 YALE J.L. & Soc. AcTiON 186 (1973); San Diego Union, June 6,
1976, § A, at 1, col. 1. Act of Aug. 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. VIII, §
808(b) (2), 88 Stat. 729, amended the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601
et seq. (1970), to prohibit sex discrimination in the financing of housing.
Thus, this legislation forbids a creditor from setting less favorable loan
terms for women than are set for men. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (Supp. IV, 1974).
5. A recent study shows that women obtain fewer loans for the purpose
of education than do men. For example, in California in 1972, the distribu-
tion of people participating in the Federal Guaranteed Student Loan Pro-
gram was approximately seventy men for every thirty women. Gates,
Credit Discrimination Against Women: Causes and Solutions, 27 VAND. L.
REV. 409, 410 n.3 (1974), citing HEW, REPORT OF THE GUARANTEED STUDENT
LOAN PROGRAM, DisTmRBUToN OF CUMULATIVE LOANS AS OF JUNE 30, 1972
(1973).
6. See CONSUMER CREDIT 5.
7. See Statement of Arline Lotman, Economic Problems of Women,
supra note 3, at 482; CONSUMER CREDIT 5-7.
8. For the purposes of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the term un-
married includes a person who is divorced or widowed. 12 C.F.R. § 202.3
(n) (1976).
9. 12 C.F.R. § 202 et seq. (1976). This statute amends the Consumer
Credit Protection portion of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et
seq. (1968). For a brief synopsis of the legislative history of the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, see Gates, supra note 5, at 425.
10. For the date when each section becomes effective, see 12 C.F.R. §
202.14 (1976).
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A creditor shall not discriminate against any applicant on the basis
of sex or marital status with respect to any aspect of a credit trans-
action."l
The language of the ECOA is broad enough to include regulation
of virtually all creditors 12 and permits injured parties to invoke
federal enforcement sanctions against creditors that illegally dis-
criminate.13
DISCRIIiNATORY CREDIT PRACTICES
Like the language of some state statutes,14 the ECOA explicitly
prohibits creditors from using any criteria to determine credit-
worthiness that favor one sex over the other.' 5 However, because
11. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (1976). "Discriminate against" means to treat an
applicant or prospective applicant less favorably than others on the basis
of sex or marital status. 12 C.F.R. § 202.3 (p) (1976).
12. 12 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1976) provides:
This Part applies to all persons who regularly extend, offer to ex-
tend, arrange for or offer to arrange for the extension of credit for
any purpose whatsoever and in any amount. (emphasis added)
See also 12 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1976), which includes within the Act's provi-
sions those credit transactions "subject to regulation under section 7 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934." But see 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.3(e), (j) (1976),
which exempt from the Act's provisions certain transactions involving credit
cards; and 12 C.F.R. § 202.3 (o) (1976), which exempts "negotiated advances
under an open end real estate mortgage or a letter of credit."
13. 12 C.F.R. § 202.13 (c) (1976) provides:
Without regard to the amount in controversy, any action under this
Title may be brought in any United States district court or in any
other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year of the date
of the occurrence of the violation.
See Lilliston, supra note 2, at 9, col. 1.
14. See, e.g., CAL. Cw. CODE § 1812.30 (West Supp. 1976). This statute
contains not only general prohibitions against sex or marital status discrim-
ination regarding creditworthiness based on property and earnings, id.
§§ 1812.30(a), (b), (c), (d), but also an express provision that creditors, in
"utilizing any other relevant factors or methods in determining whether to
extend credit to an applicant," may use such factors only if they "are
applicable to all applicants without regard to their sex or marital status."
Id., § 1812.30 (h). See generally Comment, Credit For Women in California,
22 U.C.L.A. L. Rsv. 873, 886-88 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Credit For
Women].
15. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (1976), provides:
A creditor shall not discriminate against any applicant on the basis
of sex or marital status with respect to any aspect of a credit trans-
action. (emphasis added)
But see text accompanying notes 33 to 36 infra. The most significant weak-
ness in the language of the ECOA is the provision that permits creditors
to retain in their files information obtained prior to June 30, 1976, even
if such information would otherwise be prohibited under the Act. Although
the ECOA prohibits creditors from using this information in evaluating ap-
plications, insufficient safeguards exist to assure that creditors are not in
fact using this information as a basis for denying credit to an applicant.
See 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(k) (1976).
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creditors' rights must be protected through maintenance of credit
standards, 6 the ECOA permits creditors to request information
in an application that is not sexually discriminatory.17
Discriminatory Practices Against All Women
Most creditors employ a credit scoring system to determine the
creditworthiness of each individual applicant.' 8 Under this system,
credit points are often granted on the basis of factors such as the
applicant's profession or length of employment. In the past, many
creditors discriminated against women applicants by refusing to ex-
tend credit to them unless the women satisfied higher evaluation
standards than were required of men.19 The ECOA, however, ex-
pressly prohibits any such differential treatment based on the sex
or marital status of an applicant.20 This provision thus does much
to completely eliminate discrimination based on marital status or
sex.
Although creditors have asserted that they do not discriminate
on the basis of sex, the following statement, made by one creditor
16. Because it is not the ECOA's purpose to require creditors to extend
credit to people not deemed creditworthy, TIL ACT AimNDMENTs 20, the
law does permit creditors to consider various factors, such as education, sal-
ary, and years on the job, in determining whether to grant the applicant
credit. Cf. Lilliston, supra note 2, at 9, col. 1. See generally CONSUMER
CREDIT 152.
17. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.2, 202.3 () (1976).
18. See B. ETTINGER & D. GoLIEB, CREDITs AND CoLLECTIoNs 11-17 (5th ed.
1962). Such a scoring system usually includes essential elements such as
income, employment, and payment habits, as well as other less crucial
factors, such as residence, age, and reserve assets. R. COLE, CONSUMER AND
Co UvMCIAL. CREDIT MUNAGEMENT 291 (4th ed. 1972).
19. Women were often required to meet higher standards in areas such
as length of employment, educational level, time at present residence, and
minimum salary; or credit would be denied. See Kellog, Giving Credit
Where Credit is Long Overdue, WovA_-s DAY, Feb. 1973, at 52. Using dif-
ferent and stricter standards as a basis for granting credit to women is a
prominent example of the discriminatory creditor practices discussed in TIL
ACT AMEND ENTS 16.
20. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2 (1976). Furthermore, creditors cannot take "sex or
marital status into account in a credit scoring system or other method of
evaluating applications." 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(f) (1976). See Statement of
the National Organization for Women (NOW), Oversight Hearings on 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601-81(t) Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and
TIL ACT AMaENDMENTS 16-17, referring to numerous unsolicited complaints
to various women's groups.
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regarding the creditworthiness of a woman, betrays their preju-
dices:
Betting on her to be able to work every day for the next four years
isn't the same as betting on a man. It is impossible to put a man
and a woman on the same level completely as far as extending
credit is concerned.2 1
Although creditors have offered many justifications for these dis-
criminatory practices, they have not been shown to be valid.22 In-
deed, despite the facts that women are more often unemployed than
men,23 are paid less for equivalent work,2 4 and are often relegated
to jobs with little opportunity for advancement, 25 studies have
21. Hyatt, Creditors Say Ability to Pay-Not Sex-Is First Consideration,
Wall Street Journal, July 18, 1972, at 24, col. 3 (east. ed.). Congressperson
Martha Griffiths of Michigan has noted:
Banks, savings and loan associations, credit card companies, finance
companies, insurance companies, retail stores, and even the federal
government discriminate against women in extending credit. And
they discriminate against women in all stages of life-whether sin-
gle, married, divorced or widowed; with or without children, rich
or poor, young or old.
Id., at 1, col. 6. See also Adams, Bankers Urged to Reconsider Assumptions
Regarding Women and Credit, AmERncAN BA'Ksa, June 25, 1973, at 12, col.
3, in which the President of the American Banker's Association admitted
that "banks, along with the rest of the credit industry, do in fact discrimi-
nate against women when it comes to granting credit."
22. The reasons include not only the outdated belief that a woman's legal
status is inferior to a man's, see Hyatt, supra note 21, at 24, col. 7, but also
the groundless belief that women are inherently less stable and responsible
than men. See Comment, Women and Credit, 12 DuQ. L. REv. 863, 875-
76 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Women and Credit]. Another commonly
advanced reason is that women will become pregnant and unable to work
and will therefore default on credit payments. See text accompanying
notes 27 to 36 infra. For a fifty-state study of laws that identifies possible
statutory origins of sex and marital status discrimination, see Hearings on
Credit Discrimination Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, App. at
725-1301 (1974).
23. A table of the national labor force participation rates for workers
twenty years and over shows that in 1972, 5.4 percent of the women were
unemployed as compared to 4.0 percent of the men. In 1971, the ratio was
5.7 percent to 4.4 percent; in 1970, 4.8 percent to 3.5 percent; and in 1969
3.7 percent to 2.1 percent. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MANPOWER REPORT OF THE
PRESIDNT 65-66 (1973). See also Statement of Congressperson Griffiths,
Economic Problems of Women, supra note 3, at 2-3.
24. According to a report of the President's Council of Economic Advi-
sors, in 1971, the average full-time female worker grossed $5,593, only 59.5
percent as much as the gross for the average full-time male worker, whose
earnings were $9,399. TnME, Feb. 12, 1973, at 69. In 1973, a woman's
earnings averaged only 57 percent of a man's. Economic Problems of
Women, supra note 3, at 2, 73. See also EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMiNis-
TRATiON, WOMEN's BuREAu, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN WoncERs TODAY 6
(1973).
25. Women are more apt than men to be white-collar workers, but
the jobs they hold are usually less skilled and pay less than those
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shown that women are better credit risks than men.
26
Before the passage of the ECOA, women of child-bearing age
were particularly subject to discrimination. Creditors, believing
that women in this age group were unlikely to remain long in the
work force,27 would request information regarding the woman's
choice of birth control method.28 Indeed, prior to the enactment
of the ECOA, some creditors demanded that women applicants
swear by affidavit that they would not endanger their ability to
repay their debts by having children.
29
Prompted by a belief that this practice was both unfair3 0 and un-
of men. Women professional workers are most likely to be teach-
ers, nurses, and other health workers, while men are most fre-
quently employed in professions other than teaching and health.
Women are less likely than men to be managers and officials, and
are far more likely to be clerical workers.
WoMEN WoRKERs TODAY, supra note 24, at 5. See also Economic Problems
of Women, supra note 3, at 73.
26. Several studies have indicated that single women are better credit
risks than men. See, e.g., D. DURAND, RISK ELEMENTS IN CoNsumER IN-
STALLMENT FINANCING 74-77 (1941); Smith, Measuring Risk on Installment
Credit, 11 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 327-40 (1964). See also Statement of Mar-
garet J. Gates and Jane R. Chapman, Co-directors, Center for Women Policy
Studies, Economic Problems of Women, supra note 3, at 206.
27. The assumption seemed to be that single women would marry and
voluntarily quit their jobs and that married women would be forced to quit
because of pregnancy and child care. Consequently, these women were
thought to be poorer credit risks than men in the same age group. See
Gates, supra note 5, at 409; Credit For Women in California, supra note
14, at 877; Littlefield, Sex-Based Discrimination and Credit Granting Prac-
tices, 5 CoNN. L. REV. 575, 588-90 (1973). However, studies indicate that,
contrary to this assumption, women of childbearing age do work. For ex-
ample, in 1972, the following percentages of single women worked in the
following age groups: 20-24, 69.9 percent; 25-34, 84.7 percent; 35-44, 71.5
percent. The percentage of married women who worked in the same age
groups was: 20-24, 48.5 percent; 25-34, 41.3 percent; 35-44, 48.6 percent.
The percentage of divorced, separated, or widowed women in these age
groups was even higher: 20-24, 57.6 percent; 25-34, 62.1 percent; 35-44, 71.7
percent. Economic Problems of Women, supra note 3, at 7. See also TIL
ACT AMENDMENTS 19, which indicates that in 1970, 44 percent of working-
age women were in the labor force.
28. See, e.g., Hyatt, supra note 21, at 1, col. 6.
29. Littlefield, supra note 27, at 589. See also Hyatt, supra note 21, at
1, col. 6.
30. There is no evidence that a woman who has a child will permanently
terminate her employment by failing to return to the work force. See
WoIMN WoRKERs TODAY, supra note 24, at 4; Littlefield, supra note 27, at
590-91. Even if the mother chooses to quit working outside the home, no
indication exists that she will default on her obligations. Indeed, because
Comments[VOL. 13: 960, 1976]
necessary,3 1 the authors of the ECOA expressly forbid creditors
from requesting any information from women applicants concern-
ing "birth control practices or childbearing intentions or capabili-
ties."3 2 The Act does permit creditors to "request and consider
any information concerning the probable continuity of an appli-
cant's ability to repay. . .. "33
Initially the language of the ECOA did not include any restric-
tions on questions concerning child-bearing intent. Thus, under the
language that was originally proposed, creditors were not prohib-
ited from asking a woman applicant if she intended to have chil-
dren.3 4 Because such plans might very well affect her ability to
repay-at least in a creditor's mind-the creditor would have been
within its rights to ask this question. 35 Yet if a woman is required
to disclose her attitude toward having children, she is impliedly dis-
closing her birth control practices. Thus, under the initial language
of the ECOA, a creditor would have been able to indirectly inquire
into an applicant's method of birth control. However, this weak-
ness in the Act was eliminated by changing the language to permit
creditors to question applicants about factors affecting their ability
to repay only if such factors are considered "without regard to sex
or marital status.
'3 6
Discrimination Against Married Women
Many creditors assume that a man is a better credit risk if he
well over one-half of the women of childbearing age in the United States
worked in 1972, there does not seem to be any significant correlation be-
tween a woman's being of childbearing age and being creditworthy. See
Littlefield, supra note 27, at 591-92.
31. Reports indicate that women are showing "far greater propensity to
work and to avoid interruption in their careers." Adams, supra note 21,
at 12, col. 3. This attitude, coupled with a trend toward smaller families
and mothers who are gainfully employed, suggests that questions regarding
birth control methods, even if they were not discriminatory, are not actually
necessary for a creditor to validly decide whether to extend credit to an
applicant. See id., at col. 1, indicating that between 1947 and 1971 the fe-
male labor force increased almost 100 percent, while the population in-
creased only 40 percent and that the number of women in the labor force
is projected to increase by 70 percent during the next ten years. See also
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MANPowER REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 64-66 (1973).
32. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5 (h) (1976).
33. Id. at (a).
34. See 40 Fed. Reg. 42031 (1975), which provided:
A creditor shall not request information about birth control prac-
tices or childbearing capability. However, a creditor may request
and consider information concerning the probable continuity of an
applicant's ability to repay.
35. See text accompanying notes 28 to 30 supra.
36. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(h) (1976).
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is married.3 7 Yet married women have greater difficulty in obtain-
ing credit than do any other women.38 This problem stems not only
from discriminatory statutory laws39 but also from archaic social
attitudes.40 These attitudes continue despite the enactment in
every state of statutes nullifying many common law disabilities of
37. "Presumably, the assumption is made that marriage indicates a sta-
bility of character which relates to creditworthiness." Littlefield, supra
note 27, at 580. See also Gates, supra note 5, at 427.
38. Creditors are often unwilling either to extend credit to a married
woman in her own name or to issue her credit for which she would be eligi-
ble if she were single. See TIL ACT AMENDMENTS 16-17; CONSUMER CREDIT
152-53.
39. See, e.g., former CAL. Civ. COD. §§ 5116, 5121 (West 1970), as amended
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5116, 5121 (West Supp. 1976). The result of
this type of legal restriction was that many creditors "[told] women that
they [could] not give them credit in their own names because it [was]
against the law." Pollard, Credit Discrimination, State Women Fighting,
Sacramento Sun-Telegram, Feb. 26, 1973, § B, at 1, col. 3. See also Gates,
supra note 5, at 413; Comment, The Discredited American Woman: Sex
Discrimination in Consumer Credit, 6 U.C.D. L. REv. 61, 70-71 (1973); Getze,
Getting Credit: It All Adds Up to Numbers Game in Money, L.A. Times,
Oct. 20, 1973, pt. I, at 23, col. 2.
40. This attitude possibly flows from the invalid presumptions that a
wife is always dependent on her husband and that this dependency affects
her creditworthiness. See TIL ACT AMENDMENTS 19. In 1872, the United
States Supreme Court stated the then generally accepted view of women
in Bradwell v. the State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
concurring):
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life .... The paramount destiny and mission of women are to
fulfill the noble and benign office of wife and mother.
Congressperson Martha Griffiths has stated that "the reasoning used to deny
women credit is often a cobweb of myths and suppositions unsupported by
research." Hyatt, supra note 21, at 1, col. 6. Compare E. FIEX R, CENTURY
OF STRUGGLE 9 (1968):
When the country was being settled, women participated with men
in plowing the land and fending off the Indians, as well as in their
traditional roles of potter, weaver, spinner, cook, teacher, and
nurse; such participation helped to weaken the traditional Euro-
pean patriarchal values and democratize the family. Strong and
determined women worked side by side with men and achieved
practical equality, for the brutal frontier conditions established a
certain rough egalitarianism which challenged other, long-estab-
lished concepts of propriety.
Despite this, however, creditors believed that state laws prevented them
from dealing with women on the same basis as men. See, e.g., Gates, supra
note 5, at 413, citing Testimony of Matthew Hale, Counsel for the American
Banker's Association, Hearings on the Availability of Credit to Women Be-
fore the National Commission on Consumer Finance (1972).
married women.41 The ECOA also does much to eliminate many
of these problems.
Before the enactment of the ECOA, many creditors evaluated ap-
plicable credit standards more strictly if the wife, rather than the
husband, was the primary wage earner.42 In addition, a woman ap-
plicant frequently had to rely on the creditworthiness of her hus-
band in order to obtain credit, even if she was to have exclusive
use of the account and was the more creditworthy of the two.43 The
Act, however, changes these long-established creditor practices.
While it does permit the creditor to ascertain whether an appli-
cant's spouse will use the account,44 it limits the use of this informa-
tion.4 5 However, because creditors' rights must also be pro-
tected, the ECOA permits creditors to request and consider infor-
mation about an applicant's spouse when the application indicates
the spouse either will be using the account or will be contractually
liable on it. 4
6
Creditors have also discriminated against married women by re-
fusing to permit them to maintain their separate credit standing af-
ter marriage. Many creditors customarily discontinued a woman's
credit accounts after her marriage and compelled her to reapply in
her husband's name.41 Thus, the woman was subjected to a re-
evaluation of creditworthiness based on her husband's credit sta-
tus. 48 Furthermore, once credit was issued in her husband's name,
all subsequent credit transactions in which she was involved be-
41. These statutes are usually entitled Married Women's Property Acts.
See L. KANowITz, WOMn AN D s LAW, THE UZN~m'rsH REVoLUTION 40
(1969).
42. TIL ACT AMENDMENTS 16-17. Although such conduct is now ob-
viously in violation of the ECOA, prior to its passage the creditor practice
regarding credit cards and accounts was to issue them in the husband's
name. CONSumER CREDIT 152.
43. CONSUMER CREDIT 152.
44. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (1) (i) (1976).
45. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (1) (i)-(iv) (1976). The ECOA also provides
that if a creditor asks the applicant's marital status, only the terms
"married," "unmarried," or "separated" may be used. 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(c)
(2) (1976). Furthermore, if the application asks the applicant to designate
a title such as Mr., Mrs., Ms., or Miss, it must "state conspicuously that
the designation of such title is optional." 12 C.F.R § 202.4(c) (4) (1976).
46. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (1) (i), (ii) (1976).
47. See CONSUMER CREDIT 152; TIL AcT AMENDMENTS 16-17. See gen-
erally Women and Credit 866-67.
48. Even if the wife had been considered creditworthy when she was sin-
gle, she was re-evaluated because she was considered to be dependent on
her new husband for support. See CONSUMER CREDIT 152; TIL ACT AMEND-
ENTS 16-17.
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came a part of her husband's credit file.49 This practice prevented
the wife from building any credit standing of her own.
Despite creditor arguments advanced in support of these require-
ments,50 the ECOA expressly forbids creditors from terminating an
existing credit account or requiring reapplication in a spouse's name
solely on the basis of a change in name or marital status. 51 The
Act also requires creditors to consider the credit history of an appli-
cant's prior accounts if the applicant can show that it accurately
reflects her "willingness or ability to repay."52 Therefore, cred-
itors must consider the credit rating an applicant had when she was
single in evaluating her subsequent applications. 5
Another example of discrimination against married women is the
long-established creditor practice of refusing to include all a wife's
income in determining whether a married couple earns enough
money to be eligible for a loan or mortgage.54 One spokesperson,
49. See TIL ACT AVIENDMAENTS 16-17; Women and Credit 866-67.
50. The major justification for this practice, offered even by creditors
who claimed to be unbiased, was that requiring a spouse to reapply was
economically motivated. Because the opening and maintenance of two
credit accounts per family is costly, it was simply "good business" to main-
tain only one account per family. See Hyatt, supra note 21, at 24, col. 3;
Pollard, supra note 39, at 3, col. 3. For a discussion of why this reasoning
is invalid, see Credit For Women, supra note 14, at 884-85. See also Gates,
supra note 5, at 414-15, indicating that creditors generally prefer to keep
the one account in the husband's name.
51. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(i) (1) (1976):
[I] n the absence of evidence of inability or unwillingness to repay,
a creditor shall not take any of the following actions with respect
to a person who is contractually liable on an existing open end
account on the basis of a change of name or marital status:
(i) Require a reapplication; or
(i) Require a change in the terms of the account; or
(iii) Terminate the account.
52. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5 (j) (2) (1976). Another section of the ECOA requires
creditors, when furnishing information to consumer reporting agencies, to
furnish all information regarding an account which both spouses use in the
names of both spouses. A wife is thus able to continue building a credit
standing independent of her husband's. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.6(a), (b)
(1976). The ECOA also provides that a creditor shall not prohibit an appli-
cant from "opening or maintaining an account in a birth-given first name
and surname or a birth-given first name and a combined surname." A
married woman is thus permitted to retain her maiden name if she so de-
sires. See 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(e) (1976).
53. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.6 (a), (b) (1976).
54. See, e.g., Women Win More Credit, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 12, 1974 at 76;
CONSUMER CREDIT 153.
in referring to this practice, indicated it had long been bank policy
to discount all or part of a working wife's salary.r However, the
ECOA prohibits the practice of discounting an applicant's income
on the basis of sex or marital status.5
Discriminatory credit practices abounded in both common law
and community property states prior to the passage of the ECOA.
However, because of the special limitations imposed on wives by the
community property system, women domiciled in community prop-
erty states often found it more difficult to obtain credit than did
their counterparts in common law states.
Generally, liability for debts in community property states is
based on management and control of the community property. 7 In
states that grant the husband sole management and control, his sig-
nature binds both his separate property and the marriage's com-
munity property. 58 In these jurisdictions the wife's signature,
while binding her separate property or earnings, is not sufficient
to bind community property.50 Therefore, unless a married woman
has substantial separate property, creditors can protect their inter-
ests only by obtaining the husband's signature on credit applica-
tions. This situation naturally hinders the wife's ability to obtain
credit ° and to deal responsibly in our credit-oriented society.0'
The ECOA allows a creditor to require the signature of an appli-
cant's spouse only if such requirement is imposed on all applicants,
regardless of their sex or marital status.62 Because marriage cre-
55. Women and Credit 868 n.12. See CONSUIER CREDIT 152-53.
56. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (1976), states:
A creditor shall not discount the income of an applicant or an appli-
cant's spouse on the basis of sex or marital status.
57. See, e.g., H. VERRALL & A. SA UVs, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA
ComvvuNiTY PROPERTY 284-89 (2d ed. 1971). See generally W. DE FUNiAx
& M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY (2d ed. 1971).
58. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 2403, 2404 (West 1971). See gen-
erally DE FuNiAK & VAUGHN, supra note 57, at 374-80.
59. In some community property states, the rule is still that management
and control of the community property is with the husband. See, e.g., LA.
Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2404 (West 1971). See generally DE FUNIAK &
VAUGHN, supra note 57, at 276-78.
60. See, e.g., Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 111 P.2d 641 (1941).
61. See Comment, Credit Equality For the California Woman, 3 U. SAN
FERNANDO V. L. REv. 125, 128 (1974).
62. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7 (a) (1976). This provision, like the Act itself, is de-
signed to ensure the non-discriminatory extension of credit while giving
recognition to each state's system of law. See TIL ACT AMENDMENTS 20.
Thus, the Act expressly provides that:
Consideration or application of State property laws directly or indi-
rectly affecting creditworthiness shall not constitute discrimination
for purposes of this Part.
12 C.F.R. § 202.5 (l) (1976).
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ates certain legal relationships between spouses that creditors must
be permitted to take into account,03 the Act lists certain situations
in which the creditor may require the signature of an applicant's
spouse. 4 However, these situations arise only in jurisdictions that
limit the amount of control granted to the wife.6 5
The recent passage of legislation in California extending equal
management and control of community property to both spouses66
should eliminate many of these problems. This legislation implic-
itly confers on the wife equal credit standing6 7 by making the prop-
erty of the marital community liable for the contracts of either
spouse.6 6 Because her signature will now bind all community as-
sets,6 9 creditors may require her husband's signature only under
certain circumstances. 7
0
63. For example, knowledge of a person's marital status is sometimes
necessary to comply with certain state laws and protect a creditor's interest
in collateral to which a spouse may have a right. Gates, supra note 5, at
427-30.
64. 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.7(b), (c) (1976), provides:
Where a married applicant applies for unsecured credit in a com-
munity property State, a creditor may request or require the signa-
ture of a non-applicant spouse if:
(i) The applicable State law denies the applicant power to man-
age or control sufficient community property to qualify for the
amount of credit requested under the creditor's standards of
creditworthiness; and
(ii) The applicant does not have sufficient separate property to
qualify for the amount of credit requested without regard to any
community property.
(C) Signatures on certain instruments. Where a married or
separated applicant applies for secured credit, the creditor may
require the signature of the applicant's spouse on such instru-
ments as are necessary, under the applicable statutory or de-
cisional law of a State, or are reasonably believed by the creditor
to be so necessary, to create a valid lien, pass clear title, waive
inchoate rights to property or assign earnings.
65. See, e.g., Economic Problems of Women, supra note 3, at 456-57.
66. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 5105, 5116, 5125, 5127 (West Supp. 1976).
67. The foundation on which this concept of community property is based
is the view that marriage is a union that, like a partnership, gives each
party a right to manage and conduct the partnership business. See W.
WINTER, THE NEw CALIFORNIA DIVORCE LAw 98 (1969); Grant, How Much
of a Partnership is Marriage? Community Property Rights Under the Cali-
fornia Family Law Act of 1969, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 249 (1971).
68. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 5116, 5125 (West Supp. 1976).
69. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 5116 (West Supp. 1976). See also id. § 5125
for certain limitations imposed on this rule.
70. See note 64 supra.
Discrimination Against Separated or Divorced Women
Women who have recently been separated or divorced also suffer
extensive credit discrimination. Because creditors feel that "di-
vorced and separated persons, as a group, are bigger credit risks
[and] .. .don't, as a group, pay their bills as well as singles and
married people,"71 women in these former categories have experi-
enced great difficulty in obtaining credit.72
A married woman generally relied solely on credit issued in her
husband's name whenever she needed credit.73 If she became sepa-
rated or divorced and desired to acquire credit in her own name,
she frequently found that obtaining such credit was difficult.74 Be-
cause a separated woman more often has to establish new credit
than does a man, she more frequently faces creditor prejudice
against separated people.75 For example, creditors often unduly de-
layed consideration of a recently separated person's credit applica-
tion.76 The justification offered by creditors for this practice was
that a sudden change in marital status temporarily rendered the
applicant less stable and reliable.77 But there is no requirement
that a newly separated man notify his creditors of his changed
marital status: Thus, only women were actually subjected to this
delay.7s
71. Getze, supra note 39, at 23, col. 2. See also Smith, supra note 26,
at 335.
72. Divorced women experience greater difficulty in obtaining credit than
do divorced men for the simple reason that upon separation the woman
more often has to subject herself to creditor prejudice against divorced
people by reapplying for credit. See text accompanying notes 73-75 infra.
To a lesser extent, widowed women suffer from similar types of creditor-
imposed credit disabilities. See, e.g., CONSUMER CREDIT 153; Lilliston, supra
note 2, at 1, col 4.
73. See, e.g., Gates, supra note 5, at 417.
74. Even if the wife had been deemed creditworthy prior to marriage,
her divorce might create problems in re-establishing credit in her own
name. CONSUMER CRDIT 152-53.
75. Most married couples' credit is issued in the husband's name. There-
fore, upon separation or divorce, he need do nothing more than maintain
his existing accounts, while his wife must apply for new accounts. See
Women and Credit 867; Lilliston, supra note 2, at 1, col. 2-3.
76. These delays sometimes extended for as long as twelve months.
Women and Credit 866-67.
77. See Gates, supra note 5, at 427; Women and Credit 866.
78. Even when the woman's application was finally considered, she was
often penalized for the poor credit ratings of her ex-spouse. Indeed, an em-
ployee of one credit bureau indicated that even if a divorced women re-
quested a new credit file in her own name, only detrimental information
was transferred to it. Kellog, supra note 19, at 152. Similarly, widows
often found it so difficult to establish credit in their own names that they
continued to use their deceased husband's credit accounts. Women Now
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The ECOA does much to eliminate these discriminatory practices.
It prohibits creditors from making any statements based on an ap-
plicant's marital status which would discourage the applicant from
applying for credit.7 9 More importantly, the Act requires a creditor
to consider the credit history of any account which both spouses
had used or for which both had been contractually liable in evaluat-
ing an applicant's creditworthiness."0  Thus, creditors must consider
a separated woman's joint marital accounts in evaluating her cred-
itworthiness.8' Finally, the ECOA expressly requires a creditor,
within a reasonable time after receiving an application, to notify
the applicant of any action taken upon the application.82
Divorced or separated women suffered additional discrimination
if they were recipients of support payments. These women fre-
quently found that creditors would not readily extend credit on the
basis of income derived from alimony, child support, or other
form of maintenance payment,83 for creditors feared that these pay-
ments were not reliable sources of income.8 4
Prior to the passage of the ECOA, creditors frequently denied
credit to an applicant whose income was based in whole or in part
on support payments.8 5 Realizing that the creditors' fears might
be justified,8 6 the legislature permitted creditors to continue to ask
Want Credit Liberated, Bus. WEEK, May 6, 1972, at 36; Hyatt, supra note
21, at 1, col. 6.
79. 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(a) (1976).
80. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(j) (1), (2) (1976).
81. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
82. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(m) (1) (1976). Furthermore, if an applicant who
is denied credit so requests, the creditor must provide the applicant with the
reasons for the denial. Id. (m) (2).
83. See, e.g., Statement of Arline Lotman, Economic Problems of Women,
supra note 3, at 484.
84. However, the Citizen's Advisory Council on the Status of Women, in
its January 1972, memorandum, The Equal Rights Amendment and Alimony
and Child Support Laws, mentioned one study which showed that within
one year after the decree of divorce, 38 percent of the husbands were in
full compliance with the support order. The figure dropped to 28 percent
for the second year; 26 percent for the third; 22 percent for the fourth; 19
percent for the fifth; and 17 percent for the sixth through the ninth years.
Such figures indicate that those husbands who continue support payments
for six years after the divorce decree will probably continue to pay for the
next few years. Gates, supra note 5, at 417 n.37.
85. See, e.g., Gates, supra note 5, at 411, 417.
86. See Credit For Women, supra note 14, at 878-79.
whether any income stated in an application is derived from support
payments.8 7 However, the ECOA prohibits creditors from arbitrar-
ily excluding income from consideration merely because it is a sup-
port payment.88 Creditors must now consider support payments as
income "to the extent that such payments are likely to be consist-
ently made. '8 9 Thus, support payments that have been regularly re-
ceived over a substantial period of time should be included in the
evaluation of an applicant's creditworthiness 0 The ECOA also
permits creditors to consider information regarding the party who
is obligated to pay the support if the application indicates reliance
upon such payments as a basis for repayment of the credit re-
quested.91
REMEDIS AVAILABLE UNDER THE ECOA
In attempting to eliminate sex and marital status credit discrim-
ination, the ECOA provides numerous sanctions for violations of its
provisions. The Act is designed to inform consumers of their credit
rights,9 2 to enlist their aid in obtaining enforcement, and to compel
compliance by creditors through consumer actions.98
The provisions which require a creditor to inform a consumer of
his or her rights under the Act are clear: Creditors must include
87. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d) (1) (1976). Before a creditor can make such an
inquiry, however, it must first disclose to the applicant that such income
need not be revealed. Id. This Act also permits the creditor to consider
whether an applicant is obligated to make support payments in evaluating
creditworthiness. Id. § 202.5 (c).
88. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5 (d) (2) (1976).
89. Id.
90. Id. This section specifically provides:
Factors which a creditor may consider in determining the likelihood
of consistent payments include, but are not limited to, whether the
payments are received pursuant to a written agreement or court
decree; the length of time the payments have been received; the
regularity of receipt; the availability of procedures to compel pay-
ment; and the creditworthiness of the payor, including the credit
history of the payor, where available to the creditor under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act or other applicable laws.
The importance of support payments as a credit indicator is arguably mini-
mal, for the majority of divorced women are employed or seeking employ-
ment. For example, in 1972, over one-half of all divorcees and widows be-
tween the ages of twenty and sixty-five were looking for work, and a
woman who is divorced or widowed at thirty-five can be expected to work
for at least twenty-five more years. See Adams, supra note 21, at 22, col.
1.
91. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (iv) (1976).
92. Consumer knowledge of the law is sometimes more effective in pro-
tecting consumers than is strict enforcement by supervisory agencies. See
CONSUMER CREDIT 193-200.
93. See text accompanying notes 99-106 infra.
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on all application forms a prominent notice regarding the Act's non-
discriminatory policy. 94 Because this notice must state the name
and address of the government agency responsible for enforcing the
ECOA,90 it serves to encourage anyone who has suffered discrimina-
tion to seek enforcement of the Act's provisions.
Moreover, the Act encourages consumer enforcement by permit-
ting a successful plaintiff to recover attorney's fees and court
costs.90 In addition, to ensure that possible plaintiffs have access
to pertinent information, the Act requires creditors to maintain for
fifteen months records of any written information used in evaluat-
ing an applicant's creditworthiness. 97 These provisions, coupled
with the fact that, regardless of the amount in controversy, a con-
sumer is entitled to sue in federal court,98 encourage consumer en-
forcement of the ECOA.
The ECOA was also designed to compensate injured parties and
to punish creditors that violate its provisions. However, creditor
liability is not absolute, for the Act exempts from liability those
creditors that have made a good faith attempt to comply with its
terms.9 9 Nevertheless, a party found in violation of the ECOA is
94. 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(d) (1976). See also id. § 202.6(b) (ii) (1976), re-
garding a similar notice which is required to be sent to married couples on
accounts established prior to November 1, 1976.
95. Id. § 202.4(d) (1976).
96. Id. § 202.13 (a) (1976). Some state statutes also contain provisions
permitting the recovery of court costs and attorney fees if the action is suc-
cessful. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE § 1812.34 (West Supp. 1976).
97. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a) (1) (1976). In addition, if a creditor has notice
that it is under investigation for a violation of the ECOA, it must retain
such information until final disposition of the investigation. Id. § 202.9 (c).
98. Id. § 202.13 (c). This provision thus gives a plaintiff broad discretion
in determining whether to bring a claim in state or federal court.
99. Id. § 202.11 (a) provides:
[I]t shall not be a violation of the [aforementioned] section if the
creditor shows by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time
of the noncompliance the creditor had established and was main-
taining suitable procedures to assure compliance with the section.
See also id. § 202.13 (b) which contains a similar exemption. This is an
important provision because an ambiguous portion of a statute will some-
times leave a party with several reasonable alternatives. The problem is
that taking one specific course might cause the party to violate another re-
quirement when looked at from another reasonable viewpoint. A court
may prefer one of the other reasonable viewpoints, and this judicial inter-
pretation could result in the creditor being found liable, even though he
attempted in good faith to comply with the ambiguous provision. See TIL
ACT AM'IENDMENTS 45-46.
liable for both actual and punitive damages. 10 0 Although the Act
limits to $10,000 the amount of punitive damages an individual
plaintiff can recover,101 it does permit an injured party to obtain
equitable relief against the creditor.10 2
Probably the most important remedial provision contained in the
ECOA is the one permitting class actions' 0 3 to be brought by in-
jured parties. 04 Because such suits permit a party who has suf-
fered discrimination to seek legal redress even if a lack of knowl-
edge or funds would otherwise have prevented her from obtaining
100. 12 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1976). The purpose of including a civil penal-
ties section in the Truth in Lending Act was to provide creditors with a
' meaningful incentive to comply with the law without relying upon an ex-
tensive new bureaucracy." TIL ACT AwrENDmENTs 14-15. The ECOA also
provides for administrative enforcement of its provisions by government
agencies such as the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, and others. 12 C.F.R. § 202.12(a) (1976). See
also 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (1968).
101. The ECOA also limits creditors' class action liability for punitive
damages to either $100,000 or 1 percent of the creditors' net worth, which-
ever is less. 12 C.F.R. § 202.13 (a) (1976).
102. Id. The equitable relief sought can be "in the nature of a permanent
or temporary injunction, restraining order or other action" (emphasis
added). Id. Cf. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1812.32 (West Supp. 1976), which permits
either the injured party, or "the Attorney General or any district attorney,"
to prosecute an action for an injunction.
103. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.[Ojne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as repre-
sentative parties on behalf of all, only if (1) the class is so numer-
ous that the joinder of all members is impractical .... (2) There
are questions of law or fact common to the class . ... (3) TheClaims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims of [sic] defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Statement of Representative Bob Eckhardt, Hearings on Class Actions and
Other Consumer Protection Procedures Before the Subcomm. on Commerce
and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). See also Miller, Class Action Primer, L.A. Daily
Journal Report, Oct. 17, 1973, at 4. The policy considerations underlying
class actions have been stated to be the fashioning of an "effective and in-
clusive group remedy" for persons exposed to "group injuries." Vasquez
v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 807, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 803, 484 P.2d 964,
971 (1971).
104. 12 C.F.R. § 202.13 (a) (1976). The Truth in Lending Act permits an
injured party to recover a minimum of $100 for violations of its provisions.
15 U.S.C. § 1640 (a) (1969). This provision has caused many courts to to-
tally deny class actions rather than to require businesses to pay $100 to
each member of a large class and thus subject the business to possible ruin
for technical violations of the law. See, e.g., Ratner v. Chemical Bank New
York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Therefore, the ECOA
amends this Truth in Lending Act provision to allow a maximum recovery
in class actions of $100,000 or 1 percent of the violator's net worth, which-
ever is less. 12 C.F.R. § 202.13(a) (1976). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(Supp. IV, 1974).
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relief,10 5 class actions protect consumers' interests better than do
conventional law suits. The mere threat of a class action is some-
times effective in enforcing compliance with a statute.10 6
CONCLUSION
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act is an effort to eliminate credit
discrimination based on sex or marital status. Because it specifi-
cally prohibits virtually all discriminatory creditor practices, the
ECOA essentially eliminates the problems that prompted its enact-
ment. However, the ECOA does more than merely protect the
rights of women: It also requires creditors to educate women con-
cerning those rights.10 7 Thus, creditors must be certain that any
differentiations they make among consumers regarding credit
standing "are based on sound, provable experience or actuarial sta-
tistics.'l0s The denial of credit to a woman who, by all objective
criteria, is as qualified as a man will no longer be tolerated under
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
Jom W. CAnurs
105. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Fur-
thermore, as one commentator stated:
When women are denied credit in violation of the law, they have
suffered a "group injury" and the denial of an effective group rem-
edy appears to raise Fourteenth Amendment issues of due process.
Comment, Credit Equality For the California Woman, 3 U. SAN FERNANDO
V. L. REV. 125, 138 (1974).
106. See Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of Class Suit,
8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 711 (1941). Compare CAL. Cry. CODE § 1812.31(b)
(West Supp. 1976), which permits an aggrieved person to recover punitive
damages "only in an individual capacity and not as a representative of a
class."
107. 12 C.F.R. § 202.4(d) (1976).
108. CONSUMER CREDIT 160.
